Focal Points, Gender Norms and Reciprocation in Public Good Games by David Zetland & Marina Della Giusta











© Henley Business School, University of Reading 2011 
   
   
Focal Points, Gender Norms 
and Reciprocation in Public 
Good Games 
Focal Points, Gender Norms 
and Reciprocation in Public 
Good Games 
   
by  by 
David Zetland and Marina Della Giusta  David Zetland and Marina Della Giusta 
   
   
   
   
   





Department of Economics 









                                   
     FOCAL POINTS, GENDER NORMS AND RECIPROCATION IN PUBLIC
GOODS GAMES
DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
Abstract. We examine the impact of information regarding other people’s choices on
individual choice in a public good experiment with two separate treatments. In the implicit
treatment, subjects do not see the average contribution of others in their group, but they
can calculate it from the information available. In the explicit treatment, subjects see the
average contribution of others in their group. If subjects are rational calculating agents as
suggested in mainstream economic theory there should be no diﬀerence in observed behavior
across treatments: agents should use all available information to make decisions.
What we see instead is quite diﬀerent and consistent with the presence of social norms:
ﬁrst, players change their behavior in response to the change in displayed information;
second, changes in individual behavior produce identical group outcomes, in terms of total
payoﬀs or eﬃciency across the two treatments. How does this happen? The display of the
average contribution of others results in behavior consistent with a focal point (Schelling,
1960), i.e., more subjects behave as reciprocators (conditioning their contributions on the
contributions of others), and fewer behave as cooperators or free-riders (unconditionally
contributing a lot or a little, respectively). This change in behavior diﬀers by gender: women
behave similarly to men when they see the average contribution by others; when they cannot,
they behave diﬀerently, favoring unconditional strategies of free-riding or cooperation. Men’s
behavior, in contrast to women’s adaption, does not adjust to social cues, as suggested by
Croson and Gneezy (2009).
1. Introduction
Over the last few years the experimental literature has provided a wealth of empirical
evidence in support of the idea that we are fundamentally social beings and our behavior
is inﬂuenced by that of others (Fehr et al., 2009). Social cues can be a powerful source of
motivation: gene-culture co-evolution models suggest that groups tend to prefer members
to share values in order to work more productively together and punish transgression of so-
cial norms (Boyd and Richerson, 1989; Bowles, 1998, 2001). The evidence from game theory
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indicates that agents like to punish transgressors, and that social pressure can improve recip-
rocation from selﬁsh agents (for a review of the evidence see Fehr et al. (2009)). Behavioral
experiments in both psychology and economics have also provided support to the presence of
framing eﬀects: presentation changes the way people respond to a problem (Kahneman and
Tversky, 2000). Research on framing in psychological games (games in which payoﬀs depend
on beliefs and not just actions) by Dufwenberg et al. (2010) shows that social inﬂuences and
framing interact with each other through belief formation: frames inﬂuence beliefs about
others’ beliefs (rather than their actions) and that might be suﬃcient to change player’s own
chosen actions.
Social norms have long featured in explanations of individual and group behavior by
economists, from the early work on social norms and conformism by Akerlof (1980) and Jones
(1984) to the recent contributions by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005); Corneo and Jeanne
(2009, 2010). Akerlof’s theory of social custom states that social norms are endogenously
determined and depend on the proportion of people who believe in them. As individuals diﬀer
both in their beliefs and the willingness to conform to other people’s beliefs, the resulting
range of social codes is consistent with multiple equilibria.
The degree of conformity with social norms is individual, but systematic variation by
gender has been observed in the burgeoning literature on the eﬀect of gender on prefer-
ence formation and mutation. For example Kamas et al. (2008) ﬁnd that there are gender
diﬀerences in altruistic behavior with women giving more than men in anonymous giving
to charity and increasing total contributions in mixed-sex pairings. A recent review of the
evidence from experimental economics by Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggests that although
women are not necessarily more altruistic than men, they are more likely to be aﬀected by
social clues on appropriate behavior.In Della Giusta et al. (2011a), we found that conformity
with social norms is higher for women than men in the UK, and that whilst part of the
diﬀerence in life satisfaction between women and men in the UK can be attributed to the
diﬀerent activities men and women carry out, a substantial part can be explained by theFOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 3
fact that women and men give diﬀerent weights to satisfaction with diﬀerent life dimensions,
eﬀectively constructing systematically diﬀerent utility functions (Della Giusta et al., 2011b).
We examine the impact of information regarding other people’s choices on individual choice
in a public good experiment with two separate treatments. In the implicit treatment,
subjects do not see the average contribution of others in their group, but they can calculate
it from the information available. In the explicit treatment, subjects see the average
contribution of others in their group. If subjects are rational calculating agents as suggested
in mainstream economic theory there should be no diﬀerence in observed behavior across
treatments: agents should use all available information to make decisions.
What we see instead is quite astonishing. First, players change their behavior in response
to the change in displayed information (more exactly, one group of players behaves diﬀerently
in one environment than a diﬀerent group of similar players in a diﬀerent environment).
Second, the mix of changes in individual behavior produces identical group outcomes in
terms of total payoﬀs or eﬃciency. In an everyday context, consider the example of a man
who changes his movements with the terrain, to maintain a steady pace. Now consider that
the man in our public goods game is actually a women — women’s actions change with the
information display in our two diﬀerent treatments, to maintain the same outcome.
How does this happen? The display of the average contribution of others results in behav-
ior consistent with a focal point (Schelling, 1960), i.e., more subjects behave as reciprocators
(conditioning their contributions on the contributions of others), and fewer behave as cooper-
ators or free-riders (unconditionally contributing a lot or a little, respectively).
1 Women are
responsible for the change in the mix of types. They behave similarly to men in Explicit,
but more women pursue unconditional strategies of free-riding or cooperation in Implicit.
The display of information matters, and it matters because female behavior diﬀers with the
information environment.
1Unfortunately, the experiment does not create a pure focal point (i.e., one equilibrium in many equilibria
on which subjects converge with the knowledge that others will also converge) because the display of the
average contribution of others facilitates an existing strategy of reciprocation. Nevertheless, we use “focal
point” in the loose sense, to describe a feature that subjects converge upon.4 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
The next section describes the experimental treatments. Section 3 presents results, Sec-
tion 4 has the discussion, and Section 5 concludes. The appendices have game instructions,
a discussion of typing methods, and an analysis of subject-pool heterogeneity.
2. Treatments
In each run of a public goods game (PGG), each player in a group of n splits his endowment
(e) between the group’s public account and his private account. A subject’s total earnings
are the sum of his private earnings plus a fraction of the public account. The researcher sets
the value of this fraction (the Marginal Contribution Ratio or MCR) somewhere between
1
n and 1.00 — the extremes leaving participants indiﬀerent to, respectively, contribution or
non-contribution to the public account.
Given that all players beneﬁt from contributions to the public account, the rational strat-
egy is to free-ride by contributing nothing to the public account and e to the private account
— leading to a Nash equilibrium in which all subjects receive e (Ledyard, 1995). The social-
welfare maximizing strategy is for all subjects to contribute e to the public account and
nothing to their private accounts, so that each subject receives MCR(n  e)  e. We deﬁne
“group eﬃciency” as average subject earnings (from public and private accounts) divided by
maximum possible earnings. A group of free-riders would have an eﬃciency of e/MCR(ne)
that will range from 100
n percent (when MCR is 1.00 and the public good creates the greatest
welfare gains) to 100 percent (when MCR is 1
n and the public good produces no welfare
gains).
By observing each player’s contributions to the public account, we can also classify him
as a “cooperator” (contributing a lot to the public account, independently of what oth-
ers do), “free-rider” (contributing little or nothing, independently of what others do), or
“reciprocator” (contributing more when others do).FOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 5
2.1. Game Procedure. This PGG is modeled on the sequential-contribution design of
Kurzban and Houser (2005) — hereafter KH — where subjects start with an initial, simul-
taneous contribution and then get one or more chances to update it before the game ends at
a random point. In Implicit (as in KH), the average contribution of others is not shown.
In Explicit, the average is shown. Besides this diﬀerence [in BOLD below], Implicit
and Explicit are identical to each other (but not to KH; see Footnote 11). Appendix A
has a copy of the instructions. The games had the following steps:
(1) Subjects were randomly placed in groups of four or ﬁve at the beginning of each run.2
(2) In period zero, all subjects had 20 seconds to make a simultaneous, initial contribution
to the public account from their 50-token endowments.3 Participants understood that
their remaining tokens were allocated to their private accounts.
Subjects knew they had at least one opportunity to conﬁrm/change their period
zero contribution. Provisional contributions were ﬁnal only when the run ended.
Period zero contributions were non-binding cheap talk, but decisions after period
zero were payoﬀ relevant because the run could end at any point.
(3) After period zero, contributions were sequential, i.e., each player had ten seconds to
change or conﬁrm his contribution while the rest of the group waited. In Implicit,
each subject saw his contribution, the total, and the number of people in his group and
“knew” the average contribution of others to be (total–own contribution)/(groupsize–
1); see Figure 1. In Explicit, he sees the average contribution of others; see
Figure 2.
2We used groups of four and ﬁve to maximize “yield” among student recruits. There were two Explicit
sessions where students were in groups of four or ﬁve. If we omit those sessions from the results, the shares
of types among the six remaining Explicit sessions are not statistically diﬀerent from shares in all eight
sessions.
3We use the following terminology: In each session, subjects played ﬁve runs of the PGG; each run had 7–32
rounds (individual decisions), grouped into two to eight periods after period zero. After period zero, each
period had the same number of rounds as the maximum number of subjects in any group, i.e., a group of
four would have four rounds (decisions) in one period. (In mixed groups of four and ﬁve, subjects in groups
of four waited while the ﬁve-player groups ﬁnished. Because subjects were already waiting for others in their
group, additional waiting for the ﬁve-player groups did not aﬀect the ﬂow of the game.) The run ended —
even in the middle of a period — when the maximum number of rounds (between 7 and 32) was reached.6 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
Figure 1. Screenshot from Implicit.
Figure 2. Screenshot from Explicit, which adds “Average contribution of OTHERS.”
(4) Each group’s public account total was updated, the next round began, and the next
member of the group could change/conﬁrm his contribution. Rounds and periods
ran without signal or interruption.
(5) Updating continued for an unknown, random number of rounds until the run ended,
contributions were ﬁnalized, and subjects saw their payoﬀs from public and private
contributions.4 Each subject received one token for each token in his private account
and 0.5 token (MCR = 0.5) for each token in the group account.
4Average contributions were biased upwards by the limited number of rounds and 1/n probability of any
given run ending after a player’s contribution decision. This bias applies to both treatments, so we ignore it.FOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 7
(6) In each session, there were ﬁve runs of the game, each ending after a quasi-random
number of rounds.5 Participants were randomly shuﬄed into groups and randomly
ordered within groups at the beginning of each run and played in the same order for
that run. They knew they were in new groups, but they did not know the number
of rounds in each run or number of runs in the session.
2.2. Typing Subjects. Each subject played the game for ﬁve runs and made one to eight
payoﬀ-relevant decisions per run (period zero contributions are ignored) with some players
making more decisions than others.6 Thus, each player in each session has 26–28 “aver-
age contribution of others/own contribution” datapoints.7 Players are typed using these
datapoints and the following equation:
xigt = αi + βi¯ xigt + ϵigt, (1)
where xigt is the contribution of person i in group (run) g in round t, ¯ xigt is the average
contribution of other group members observed by i; αi and βi are individual-speciﬁc param-
eters to be estimated, and ϵigt is a mean-zero disturbance term ( N(0,σ2
i)) that controls
for group eﬀects (g) and trend eﬀects (t).
Each individual’s type depends on αi and βi values estimated through an individual OLS
regression of Equation (1).8 Given point estimates of ˆ α and ˆ β, KH’s classiﬁcation rules for
type are as follows:
5The ﬁrst run took 16 rounds, the second was seven rounds, then 23, 32 and 32 rounds. These counts (from
KH) were used in all sessions.
6When the number of rounds divided by the number of players is not an integer the number of observations
is not equal; e.g., four subjects playing seven rounds would mean that three subjects played two rounds each
and one played a single round.
7Although it is possible to confound player behavior with behavior of the group, this problem is minimized
by reshuﬄing the players into diﬀerent groups ﬁve times during the session.
8Since KH’s classiﬁcation method uses point estimates for individuals’ parameter values (i.e., ignoring sta-
tistical signiﬁcance; see Appendix B), the error term is ignored. This method therefore ignores both group
eﬀects and trend eﬀects. The impact of the former is minimized by shuﬄing players between groups. Al-
though we ignore trend eﬀects, there is the possibility that learning matters across the ﬁve runs. When we
retype players using data from runs 2–5 (i.e., controlling for “learning”), 21/296 (seven percent) of players
change from one type to another, and aggregate shares of types shift by 0–3 percent. The between-treatment
diﬀerence of reciprocator shares actually increases. Since this result agrees with (and reinforces) our main
result, we also ignore trend.8 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
Cooperator: ˆ β  0 and ˆ α  25, i.e., a cooperator’s estimated contribution is non-
decreasing in the average contribution of others and always at least 25 (of 50) tokens.9
Free-rider: ˆ β  0 and ˆ α + ˆ β(50) < 25, i.e., a free-rider’s estimated contribution is
non-decreasing in the average contribution of others but stays below 25 tokens.
Reciprocator: ˆ β  0, ˆ α < 25, and ˆ α + ˆ β(50)  25, i.e., a reciprocator’s estimated
contribution is non-decreasing in the average contribution of others, below 25 tokens
when the average contribution of others is zero, and at least 25 tokens when the
average contribution of others is 50.
No Type: ˆ βi < 0. Players who give less when others give more are classiﬁed as “no
type” and ignored in further analysis.
Figure 3 shows datapoints for subjects who were classiﬁed as cooperators and free-riders;
Figure 4 shows subjects classiﬁed as reciprocators. Each panel shows all data for one player
in one session; the ﬁtted line matches regression output, i.e., ˆ xi = ˆ αi + ˆ βiˆ ¯ xi. Note that each
dot is a (¯ xigt, xigt) pair that records the average contributions of others to the public account
(independent variable on x-axis) and how much that subject puts in the public account
(dependent variable on y-axis).
KH’s method of classifying subjects with linear OLS point estimates is fast and easy to use
(one can “type” players with a few observations), but some worry that it ignores potentially
important factors. First, point estimates ignore the error structure of ϵigt; second, type may
not ﬁt a linear proﬁle; and third, Tobit is more appropriate for typing censored observations.
Appendix B shows that these eﬀects do not have a signiﬁcant impact on our typing results.
With Occam’s Razor in hand, we use KH’s method instead of other, more complicated means
of classiﬁcation discussed in, e.g., El-Gamal and Grether (1995); Houser et al. (2004); Houser
and Winter (2004).
9KH used 25/50 tokens (50 percent) as a cut-oﬀ between “free-riders” who never give more than half their
endowment (contributing less than 25 even when others average 50) and cooperators who always give more
than half (contributing more than 25 even when others average zero). In ultimatum games (one player
decides how to split an endowment and his partner decides to reject — leaving both with nothing — or
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Figure 3. Subjects typed as cooperators (top) and free-riders (bottom). Con-
tributions (y-axis) are in response to the (implicit or explicit) average contri-
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Figure 4. Subjects typed as reciprocators10 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of diﬀerent sessions.
Kurzban-Houser Implicit Explicit
Location U. of Arizona UC Davis UC Davis
Dates 2002 April 2007 October 2006
Sessions 4 8 8
Students 3x24, 1x12 20x6, 16x2 20x4, 16x2, 19x1, 13x1
Total Students 84 152 144
Students Classiﬁed 81 139 136
Share Male N/A 42% 57%
Share Economists N/A 37% 52%
2.3. Hypotheses. KH determine each subject’s type by comparing his contribution to the
public account to the average contribution of others in his group — a number he never sees.
In other words, KH assume subjects know the average contribution of others. If that is
true, subject behavior (and thus type) should be the same in Implicit and Explicit. The
following hypotheses test that idea:
Hc
0: The shares of cooperators in Implicit and Explicit are the same.
H
f
0: The shares of free-riders in Implicit and Explicit are the same.
Hr
0: The shares of reciprocators in Implicit and Explicit are the same.
2.4. Session Details. Each treatment in the between-subject design was repeated in eight
sessions at a UC Davis computer lab.10 Those sessions diﬀer in many ways from KH (diﬀerent
software, instructions, group sizes and time limits). Tables 1 and 2 display results from our
treatments with KH’s results, but they are not comparable.11
Unclassiﬁed students are classiﬁed as “no type” and dropped from analysis. The impacts
of diﬀerent shares of males and economists are discussed in Appendix C.
Each session began after subjects signed legal consent/disclosure forms, received their
anonymous participant number, and heard directions in Appendix A. Participants played
10Although the between-subject design has problems with subject ﬁxed eﬀects (addressed in Appendix C),
a within-subject design is not feasible because subjects (who could easily identify the diﬀerence between
treatments) could bring experience from one treatment to the next, invalidating any results from a sequential,
within-subject treatment design.
11KH use Visual Basic, and we use z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Explicit has groups of four or ﬁve students
(e.g, the 19 student session has three groups of ﬁve students and two groups of four students), but Implicit
and KH have groups of four. Decision times are limited in Implicit and Explicit but not in KH.FOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 11
Table 2. MLOGIT-adjusted shares of each type by treatment
KH Implicit Explicit
% Share 95% CI % Share 95% CI % Share 95% CI
Cooperators 13.6 12.8–14.4 10.8 10.4–11.2 4.4 4.1–4.7
Free-riders 21.0 20.0–22.0 26.5 25.9–27.1 11.8 11.3–12.2
Reciprocators 65.4 64.3–66.6 62.7 62.0–63.4 83.8 83.3–84.4
either Implicit or Explicit for ﬁve runs. After each run, they were reshuﬄed into new
groups of four or ﬁve.12 After completing the PGG and another game (not reported here),
subjects answered a questionnaire.13 Finally, each player received an anonymous cash pay-
ment in proportion to his performance. The average payment was about $15. Total session
length was less than 1.5 hours.
3. Results
Table 2 — adjusted for subject-pool heterogeneity; see Appendix C — shows that Implicit
had fewer reciprocators, more cooperators and more free-riders than Explicit. Wilcoxon
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests comparing the shares of types (e.g., shares of reciprocators
in eight Implicit sessions to shares in eight Explicit sessions) reject equal shares at the
one percent level for all three types, i.e.,
Hc
0: The shares of cooperators in Implicit and Explicit are the same. Reject.
H
f
0: The shares of free-riders in Implicit and Explicit are the same. Reject.
Hr
0: The shares of reciprocators in Implicit and Explicit are the same. Reject.
12Such reshuﬄing means that players in Explicit (which had two sessions with ﬁve-player groups) would
have been in a mix of four and ﬁve-player groups. Given the same 0.5 MCR, the greater incentive to cooperate
should have resulted in more cooperators and reciprocators, but the share of cooperators in these two sessions
was zero; the shares of reciprocators and free-riders were 88 and 12 percent, respectively compared to 83
and 11 percent in the six Explicit sessions with four-player groups and 84 and 12 percent for all Explicit
sessions. (Players in ﬁve-player groups who saw larger total contributions — relative to four-player groups
— also saw average contributions of others in their group, which would weaken the impression that others
were being more generous than they really were.)
13After Explicit, subjects participated in an auction game; after Implicit, they participated in a diﬀerent
public goods game that tested behavior under varying incentives to cooperate, i.e., tournament, in-group/out-
group, etc. While these games may have had diﬀerent impacts on questionnaire answers, we cannot isolate
these eﬀects.12 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
4. Discussion
...manipulations in the lab experiment can yield drastically diﬀerent mea-
sures of individual propensities. This result does not necessarily imply that
preferences are labile. Rather, we view such data as evidence that when criti-
cal elements of the situation change, behavior will change in predictable ways.
— Levitt and List (2007, p. 164)
Our results oﬀer signiﬁcant implications for experimental design and policy implemen-
tation. Firstly, if subject behavior depends not just on information but on the display of
information, then experimenters should be cautious about the design, execution and interpre-
tation of their treatments. Secondly, our evidence suggests that the link between underlying
preferences and revealed preferences is not as tight as rational action theory would like it
to be. For example, subjects with unconditional preferences as cooperators or free-riders
should also behave unconditionally. But framing that leads subjects to behave as reciproca-
tors may lead us to mistakenly assume that we have elicited underlying preferences when we
have actually induced behavior (and type) as a response to circumstances (Margolis, 2007,
Chapter 9).14 Smith (2003) calls this “ecological rationality,” i.e., the notion that we will do
the right thing at the right time, and the focal point eﬀect discussed here is consistent with
that rationality.15
In the large experimental literature on framing, social interaction and focal points, the
following articles touch on the present discussion: Dietrich et al. (2001) show that boundedly-
rational players pay attention to displayed information — not what they should know. In
Berg et al. (2005), subjects change from risk averse to risk seeking as framing (the same
14Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. s273) deﬁnes framing as “the language of presentation, on the context
of choice and on the nature of the display.”
15Bowles (1998) makes the more radical argument that preferences are endogenous, while McCubbins and
Weller (2009) ﬁnd that player behavior is rational when it’s conditioned on their belief about the actions of
others.FOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 13
gamble) changes. Croson (2007) ﬁnds that subjects try to match a displayed median con-
tribution more than they try to match the minimum or maximum contribution.16 Cooper
and Rege (2008) ﬁnd that players’ actions tend to polarize around the same choices — a
result they attribute to social interaction and peer eﬀects. Czap and Ovchinnikova (2008)
arbitrarily make one player a leader in a public goods game and display the leader’s contri-
bution; followers’ contributions are positively aﬀected by the leader but not vice-versa. In
studies that challenge the robustness of eﬀects consistent with a focal point, Crawford et al.
(2008) ﬁnd that a focal point eﬀect deteriorates when payoﬀs are asymmetric, and Brosig
et al. (2008) ﬁnd that players who behave as unselﬁsh “types” in a dictator game do not do
so when the game is repeated weeks later.17
The explicit display of the average contribution of others “causes” more subjects to behave
as reciprocators and fewer to behave as cooperators or free-riders. From a policy perspec-
tive, this result implies that the display of information on others’ actions combined with
conformism to social norms can guide agent behavior. Our ﬁnding that overall eﬃciency
does not change can be seen either as evidence that such a program of display will not make
us worse oﬀ, as a group. Alternatively, it may indicate that such a program will not increase
social welfare. That latter argument ignores the possibility that a “nudging” policy (that’s
easy to ignore) may increase overall utility from the process of arriving at a ﬁnal result. It’s
not hard to see that participation in a group with a larger share of reciprocators may result
in greater procedural utility than participation in a group with free-riders and cooperators
(Tyler, 1990; Benz, 2004; Frey, 2005). Many people dislike free-riders; cooperators attract
a combination of disdain and envy (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000; Rodriguez-Sickert et al., 2008;
Herrmann et al., 2008).
16She did not include mean contribution, but subject contributions have a similar correlation with observed
median and unobserved mean.
17In the game discussed here, players see the average contribution of others, which reproduces the peer-
interaction structure of Croson (2007) and Cooper and Rege (2008) — but not the leader structure of Czap
and Ovchinnikova (2008) — and a change in results seen in Dietrich et al. (2001) and Berg et al. (2005).
Because the game uses symmetric payments and repeats only once, it does not test the results of Crawford
et al. (2008) or Brosig et al. (2008), but these treatments are not designed to defend the robustness of focal






































Figure 5. Reciprocators’ contributions are closer to the mean in Explicit.
Vertical lines separate the ﬁve runs — each lasting two to eight periods.
Besides this type result, we should see — a l` a the “match the average ﬁnding in Croson
(2007) — other evidence that subjects are responding to a focal point, e.g., individual contri-
butions should converge on the average contribution of others in Explicit. Figure 5 shows
the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the average contribution of subjects typed as re-
ciprocators and the average contribution of others in those subjects’ groups.18 A t-test of the
data behind the ﬁgure (i.e., comparing average deviations by run.period between Implicit
and Explicit) rejects the null hypothesis that diﬀerences are equal at the one-percent level.
Individual contributions in explicit are closer to the group average.
For the remainder of this discussion, we will explore the factors driving these results —
starting with the role of gender (Section 4.1) before trying to understand how the gender
eﬀect may result from lazy and/or strategic behavior (Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
18These data are from 14 sessions with groups of four; two Explicit sessions with groups of ﬁve are omitted.FOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 15
Table 3. Percentage shares of types, by gender and treatment
Implicit Explicit
Females Males Females Males
Cooperators 12 9 5 4
Free-riders 38 17 10 13
Reciprocators 49 74 85 83
Before proceeding, let us clarify how and why we got here. Our original impetus for
running Implicit was to understand why Explicit results varied from KH’s (implicit)
results. Since we could not be sure that we were controlling for all relevant diﬀerences
between KH and Explicit, we ran Implicit six months later. Although we were able
to test (and reject) the null hypotheses, our desire to understand why the results diﬀered
(and control for subject-pool heterogeneity) led us to run the multinomial logit described in
Appendix C. Those results made it clear that gender (female behavior) was driving results.
And now let us proceed.
4.1. Gender and Behavior. Table 3 shows that a majority (51 percent) of females in
Implicit act as (unconditional) cooperators or free-riders while a majority (74 percent)
of males choose a conditional (reciprocator) strategy. This discrete descriptive result is
reinforced by the continuous density functions for male and female ˆ α and ˆ β values (i.e.,
intercept and slope, respectively from Equation 1). Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
of all subjects fail to reject the hypothesis that the distribution of ˆ α values from Implicit
and Explicit are the same for males and females. The same test also fails to reject statistical
equivalence for male ˆ β values but not for female ˆ β values. Put diﬀerently, females have a
diﬀerent response to others (p-value < 0.001) in each treatment.
Figure 6 makes this diﬀerence clear. The left panel displays kernel-density functions for
female ˆ β values, which are skewed to the right in Implicit (thick line) but not in Explicit
(thin line). For males (right panel), ˆ β values are similar in both treatments. Thus we see
how diﬀerent female behavior explains the diﬀerences in results between the two treatments.
(This result is robust to multi-variate controls; see Appendix C.) So why do women behave
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Figure 6. ˆ β values for females (left panel) and males (right panel) for
Implicit (thick line) and Explicit (thin line).
First, let us dismiss the explanation that subjects facing the ten-second clock in Implicit
made errors in calculating their contribution — errors that resulted in them being misclassi-
ﬁed as free-riders or cooperators when they were “really” reciprocators. Data on individual
decisions show that few were made at the last second. Instead, it seems that subjects who
wanted to reciprocate had adequate time to make their calculation, and many males (74 per-
cent) did behave as reciprocators. Females, on the other hand, were more likely to pursue
the unconditional strategies of cooperation or free-riding.
Second, we have to consider the so-called “Larry Summers Critique,” i.e., the idea that
women are not as good at math as men. Although Benjamin et al. (2006) ﬁnd that men and
women calculate equally well, it is possible that women do not bother to make the calculations
necessary for reciprocation in Implicit — an explanation that echoes the comparative
advantage ﬁnding that girls do as well as boys in math and better in reading — leading them
to pursue non-mathematical activities (Guiso et al., 2008). Thus, females may reciprocate
less often because they prefer to do otherwise, either because it is easier or because they






































Figure 7. Average absolute value of diﬀerence between a male subject’s con-
tribution and the average contribution of others in his group
Table 4. Average reciprocator deviation from contribution of others, by gen-
der and treatment, in ﬁrst and last period of each run.
Implicit Explicit
Females Males Females Males
First Period 14.03 16.59 11.79 13.89
Last Period 11.14 10.83 8.07 10.50
Decrease 2.89 5.76 3.72 3.39
% Decrease 21% 35% 32% 24%
4.2. Lazy Reciprocators. Although both male and female reciprocators contribute closer
to the average in Explicit (Figures 7 and 8 display Figure 5 results by gender), their
behavior patterns diﬀer in each treatment. Table 4 shows that male reciprocators “work
harder” to match the average contribution of others in Implicit while women work harder
than men (and ﬁnish closer to the average contribution of others) in Explicit.19
19There is little evidence of learning diﬀerences between genders. In Explicit, men and women have a
similar deviation in period 1 of run 1 (13.75 and 13.58, respectively) and in period 1 of run 5 (11.29 and






































Figure 8. Average absolute value of diﬀerence between a female subject’s
contribution and the average contribution of others in her group.
These results echo those of Cadsby and Maynes (1998a,b), who ﬁnd that groups of females
are signiﬁcantly better at coordinating around a common equilibrium than groups of males,
and Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008), who ﬁnd that women equal men in competition that
involves performance-related feedback, i.e., the case in Explicit.
Because Implicit lacks an equilibrium, women without a focal point may take the easier
way out (i.e., adopting an unconditional strategy). Males, on the other hand, may work
relatively harder because they are more competitive (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson
and Gneezy, 2009) or want to beat the game (Charness and Levin, 2008).20
4.3. Strategic Reciprocators. The smaller deviation from the mean in Explicit might
also result from players’ strategic use of a focal point to coordinate strategies. If players are
indeed pursuing interdependent strategies, the implication is that they — as a group — will
reach some form of steady-state eﬃciency that cannot be displaced by another group. Put
20Gneezy et al. (2009) ﬁnd that female competitiveness is driven by culture (nurture), not gender (nature).FOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 19
diﬀerently, the behavior of interacting subjects should produce a mix of types (cooperators,
free-riders and reciprocators) that results in eﬃcient outcomes appropriate to the treatment.
The data support this idea: Despite a dramatic change in the mix of types, average player
eﬃciencies — at 68.1 percent in Implicit and 67.8 percent in Explicit — are not sta-
tistically diﬀerent (p-value = 0.64).21 This result — group earnings in each treatment are
statistically identical — echoes Smith’s “ecological rationality,” i.e., that players change their
behavior to ﬁt the environment.
The driver of this result appears to be women; they behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent treat-
ments. Such a change has been found elsewhere and attributed to women being more strate-
gic or sensitive to changes in the information environment (Nowell and Tinkler, 1994; Seguino
and Lutz, 1996; Benjamin et al., 2007; Leon-Mejia and Miller, 2007; Croson and Gneezy,
2009). Since Explicit has a focal point, it is more likely that women will pursue a recipro-
cation strategy when others are likely to do the same.22
5. Conclusion
Public goods experiments have failed to ﬁnd consistent diﬀerences in the behavior of men
and women — perhaps because of experimental heterogeneity (Eckel and Grossman, 2008;
Croson and Gneezy, 2009). These treatments clarify gender diﬀerences by altering a single
experimental element (the implicit or explicit display of the average contribution of others)
to show how gender and design interact to produce gender-speciﬁc behavior in Implicit
but gender-neutral behavior in Explicit. In Explicit, the shares of female and male
reciprocators are, respectively, 85 and 83 percent. In Implicit, these shares drop to 49 and
74 percent, respectively (shares of both free-riders and cooperators rise). The diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant for females but not for males.
21Eﬃciency does not vary by gender either.
22Do they change “type” in a strategic way to equalize payouts? Although we have no evidence of that
(not least because treatments are between-subject), it’s possible that these results reﬂect emergent social
coordination.20 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
The best explanation for the diﬀerence in results is that women change their behavior
when the informational environment changes responding to a visible cue (focal point) that
informs them about the social norm. Interestingly, the change in types does not result in
diﬀerent average payouts, indicating that aggregate behavior in each treatment is optimal
in the sense of being evolutionarily stable. This suggests that women’s behavior balances
men’s behavior in a way that maintains stability for the whole population. More research
is needed to establish whether this result applies to wider pool of subjects, but the policy
implications can be quite important in devising incentive systems based on compliance with
social norms.
These results also contradict a common (perhaps naive) assumption that preferences reli-
ably map to behavior — underscoring the importance of understanding the impact of design
on experimental results.
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Appendix A. PGG Instructions
This is a game of group and individual investment behavior.
 You are in a group of 4 with 3 others, chosen at random. (If you are in a GROUP OF
FIVE, you will ﬁnd out during the game.)
 You have an endowment of 50 tokens to invest. Others have the same endowment.
 You invest your tokens in the Individual Exchange and the Group Exchange.
 Your earnings depend on how you and your group invest tokens.
 50 tokens = $0.75
Every token you invest in the Individual Exchange returns one token in earnings to you only.
Every token you invest in the Group Exchange returns 0.5 tokens in earnings to every mem-
ber of your group, including yourself. It does not matter who invests in the Group Exchange
— everyone gets a return from every token invested in the Group Exchange, whether or not they
invested.
Your task is to maximize your earnings by choosing how many of your tokens to invest in the
Group Exchange. (Remaining tokens go to the Individual Exchange.) Examples:
1 2 3
Your Group Exchange investment 0 50 30
Your Individual Exchange investment 50 0 20
If others' Group Exchange investments total 90 110 0
...total Group Exchange investment is ... 0 + 90 = 90 50 + 110 = 160 30 + 0 = 30
...and everyone’s Group Exchange return is 90/2 = 45 160/2 = 80 30/2 = 15
Your total earnings (in tokens) are 50 + 45 = 95 0 + 80 = 80 20 + 15 = 35
Game Timing.
(1) All members of your group start with a simultaneous investment in the Group Exchange
(Round 1). Click “Continue” after you enter your choice. You only have 20 seconds to
click. A countdown clock is in the top-right corner of your screen.
(2) In Round 2 and thereafter, you will (one person at a time) see the number of people
in your group (either 4 or 5), the TOTAL investment in the Group Exchange, [Explicit:
“and the average investment of others in your group”]. You will change or conﬁrm your
Group Exchange investment and click “Continue.” You only have 10 seconds to click. If
you take too long, your choice does not change.
(3) The opportunity to see the total and change/conﬁrm passes from person to person in your
group for an unknown, random number of rounds until the run ends, and all investments are
ﬁnal. You will have at least one opportunity to change/conﬁrm your investment. Although
you must wait while the decision passes around your group, try to pay attention so as to
not to miss your turn.
(4) When each run ends, you will see your investment, the total investment in the Group
Exchange, your earnings from the current run, and your cumulative earnings.
(5) When the game repeats, players are randomly reshuﬄed into new groups and the ﬁnal
round changes to a new, random number.
Appendix B. Typing Subjects
Table 5 compares shares of types resulting from KH’s OLS method (described in Section 2.2) and
other OLS methods (discussed below). To reduce confusion and maintain focus on typing methods
(as opposed to outcomes), shares of each type under each method are shown for the Explicit
treatment only.24 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
Table 5. Subject types by estimation method
Shares of Type (Percent) No Type
OLS Regression Coop. Free-Rider Recip. Hump (count)
all coeﬃcients 4 12 84 8
signif. coeﬀ. only 3 27 69 1
quadratic (all coeﬀ.) 4 10 72 14 6
B.1. Statistical Signicance. OLS regressions give estimates of ˆ αi and ˆ βi, and these coeﬃcients
are statistically insigniﬁcant for some individuals. KH use all point estimates in their typing —
regardless of statistical signiﬁcance — and that method is used here. Using all estimates means
ignoring error structure, but this cost to accuracy is more than compensated by avoiding an even
greater problem — bias in typing.
Bias is introduced when insigniﬁcant estimates are set to zero because zero values of ˆ β are
associated with free-riders. Put diﬀerently, assigning individuals with coeﬃcients that are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero to the free-rider group would overstate the importance of free-
riders. We can see this eﬀect in Table 5, where the share of free-riders rises from 12 percent with
point estimated coeﬃcients to 27 percent with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients only.
B.2. Quadratic Form. KH’s typing method forces each player’s actions to ﬁt a linear form, and it
is not hard to imagine that some players may play a diﬀerent strategy, e.g., increasing contributions
up to a certain point and then decreasing them. Fischbacher et al. (2001) ﬁnd that 14 percent of
subjects have such a “hump-shaped” contribution proﬁle.
Allowing for quadratic variation in Equation (1) gives us:
xigt = αi + βi¯ xigt + γi(¯ xigt   ¯ xi)2 + ϵigt, (2)
where ¯ xi is the average contribution of others for all rounds and γi is an additional parameter
to be estimated. ¯ xi is used in (¯ xigt   ¯ xi)2 to increase variation in the quadratic relationship and
reduce problems with collinearity.
When typing with Equation 2, six subjects are excluded as “no type” (meaningful negative β
and γ coeﬃcients). Of the 138 remaining subjects, 14 percent (as in Fischbacher et al. (2001)) are
humped types (positive β and negative γ coeﬃcients); 4 percent are cooperators; 10 percent are
free-riders; and 72 percent are reciprocators.
How do we interpret these results? The main shift (compared to the linear-only method) is
from reciprocators to hump-shaped. In Table 5, we see that the share of reciprocators in OLS
falls from 84 percent to 72 percent in OLS-quadratic, which has 14 percent hump-shaped types.
This result implies that some subjects typed as reciprocators with a linear approximation are really
contributing fewer tokens when the average contribution to the public account is above 28–30
tokens.
We do not use quadratic estimates because classiﬁcation of types is more arbitrary (without
statistical signiﬁcance as a ﬁlter, most subjects have some value for γ, which introduces confusion
as to who is a free-rider, reciprocator, etc.), and the only diﬀerence appears to be a transfer from
reciprocators to hump-shaped types. (It would be more troubling if free-riders and cooperators also
moved to hump-shaped types.)
B.3. Tobit Model. Finally, there is the much larger issue of contributions that are censored at
upper and lower boundaries in the estimation model (46 percent of contribution decisions — xigt
values — are 0 or 50). Since an OLS estimate of the relationship between censored values of xigt
and ¯ xigt will produce inconsistent estimates, a Tobit model would probably be more accurate. WeFOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 25
do not use Tobit because we would need to create a typing scheme around diﬀerent estimates,
which is not the point of this paper.
Appendix C. Controlling for Subject Pools
It is possible that subject-pool heterogeneity aﬀected the mix of types — recall the diﬀering
shares of males and economists in Table 1. A multinomial logit model is used to test the eﬀect of
gender, ﬁeld of study, etc. on type. Note that type depends on coeﬃcients from individual OLS
regressions of own contribution on average contribution of others. MLOGIT estimations use type
as the dependent variable and previously-unused subject characteristics as independent variables.
Table 6 has regression output, and Table 7 shows the estimated marginal eﬀects of independent
variables on the probability of being classiﬁed as a given type.23
Note that the Trust Index (TI) RHS variable is calculated from the answer to four yes/no
questions: “People generally do the right thing,” “I ﬁnd it better to accept others for what they
say and appear to be,” “I am doubtful of others until we know they can be trusted,” and “I almost
always believe what people tell me.”24 Yes answers are added (+1,+1,-1,+1) to get individual TI
values between  1 and 3. Although the correlation between answers to these questions and types
in a PGG is not perfect (e.g., someone who trusts others may be greedy, i.e., a free-rider), there is
good reason to believe that stated preferences should match revealed preferences. Put diﬀerently,
TI values should be higher for cooperators, lower for free-riders and somewhere in-between for
reciprocators; see, e.g., Tabellini (2008).
The estimated marginal eﬀects indicate that a participant in Explicit is 6 percent (insigniﬁcant)
less likely to be a cooperator, 25 percent less likely to be a free-rider, and 30 percent more likely to
be a reciprocator. Field of study (economics, quantitative or non-quantitative) is not statistically-
correlated with behavior or types. Males in Implicit are 3 percent (insigniﬁcant) less likely than
females to be cooperators, 17 percent less likely to be free-riders, and 20 percent more likely to be
reciprocators.25 These results reﬂect the importance of gender and treatment on behavior, types
and outcomes.
An adjustment to Implicit results that reﬂects diﬀerent shares of males in subject pools (42
percent in Implicit and 57 percent in Explicit) would shift about 3 percent of all subjects (males
are 20 percent more likely to reciprocate, but they were 15 percent fewer) from free riders (29.5 falls
to 26.5%) to reciprocators (59.7 rises to 62.7%). Table 8 shows results before adjustment; Table 9
shows these adjusted shares, which we consider to be a more accurate reﬂection of the mix of types
in our subject pool.
Importantly, it appears that males are not aﬀected by the diﬀerence in treatments. When we
rerun the MLOGIT with a dummy to compare male and female behavior between treatments (i.e.,
replace dummies for Explicit, Male x Explicit & Male x Implicit with dummies for Male,
Female x Explicit & Male x Explicit), coeﬃcients on Male are signiﬁcant for free-riders and
reciprocators and signiﬁcant for all types for Female x Explicit but not signiﬁcant for Male x
Explicit. Thus it appears that treatment eﬀects manifest entirely through females.
23A multinomial probit has a similar ﬁt with slightly-higher statistical signiﬁcance. The addition of a non-
interacted male dummy does not change results.
24Pre-testing included 20 “Machiavellian” questions (see Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002)), and the four with
the lowest collinearity were retained.
25We use Male x Implicit and Male x Explicit instead of the more conventional Male and Male x
Explicit to get clean estimates of between-treatment gender diﬀerences.26 DAVID ZETLAND AND MARINA DELLA GIUSTA
Table 6. Multinomial Logit of type on subject characteristics. Type 3 (Re-
ciprocator) and non-quantitative major (anything but economics or quantita-
tive majors such as engineering, sciences and MBA/Finance) omitted.
coeﬃcient p-value
Type = 1 (Cooperator)
Explicit Treatment -1.53 0.14
Male x Implicit -0.83 0.19
Male x Explicit 0.16 0.86
Econ x Implicit 0.43 0.61
Econ x Explicit -0.30 0.78
Quant x Implicit 0.79 0.29
Quant x Explicit 0.55 0.61
Age 0.06 0.75
Household size -0.32 0.11
Years in major 0.30 0.29
Experimental Experience -0.66 0.34
Trust Index 0.33 0.10
Intercept -2.77 0.48
Type = 2 (Free-Rider)
Explicit Treatment -1.76 0.01
Male x Implicit -1.51 0.00
Male x Explicit 0.17 0.77
Econ x Implicit 0.70 0.17
Econ x Explicit 0.16 0.81
Quant x Implicit -0.02 0.97
Quant x Explicit 0.17 0.84
Age 0.08 0.60
Household size 0.04 0.61
Years in major 0.02 0.94
Experimental Experience 0.29 0.45
Trust Index -0.20 0.14
Intercept -2.21 0.44
N=275 Log-likelihood = -184.56
Pseudo R2 = 0.119 χ2
(20) = 49.71
Signiﬁcant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levelsFOCAL POINTS IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 27
Table 7. Marginal eﬀects after Multinomial Logit
dy/dx p-value
Type = Cooperator
Explicit Treatment -0.057 0.29
Male x Implicit -0.026 0.28
Male x Explicit 0.006 0.89
Econ x Implicit 0.014 0.76
Econ x Explicit -0.015 0.73
Quant x Implicit 0.051 0.39
Quant x Explicit 0.031 0.69
Age 0.002 0.81
Household size -0.016 0.07
Years in major 0.015 0.29
Experimental Experience -0.031 0.21
Trust Index 0.019 0.06
Type = Free-Rider
Explicit Treatment -0.250 0.02
Male x Implicit -0.170 0.00
Male x Explicit 0.024 0.79
Econ x Implicit 0.115 0.24
Econ x Explicit 0.028 0.79
Quant x Implicit -0.013 0.87
Quant x Explicit 0.019 0.88
Age 0.012 0.62
Household size 0.008 0.42
Years in major 0.000 0.98
Experimental Experience 0.052 0.41
Trust Index -0.034 0.10
Type = Reciprocator
Explicit Treatment 0.307 0.00
Male x Implicit 0.196 0.00
Male x Explicit -0.031 0.75
Econ x Implicit -0.129 0.21
Econ x Explicit -0.125 0.91
Quant x Implicit -0.038 0.69
Quant x Explicit -0.051 0.72
Age -0.014 0.56
Household size 0.008 0.55
Years in major -0.014 0.66
Experimental Experience -0.022 0.74
Trust Index 0.015 0.49
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table 8. Shares of each type by treatment
KH Implicit Explicit
% Share 95% CI % Share 95% CI % Share 95% CI
Cooperators 13.6 12.8–14.4 10.8 10.4–11.2 4.4 4.1–4.7
Free-riders 21.0 20.0–22.0 29.5 28.9–30.1 11.8 11.3–12.2
Reciprocators 65.4 64.3–66.6 59.7 59.0–60.4 83.8 83.3–84.4
Table 9. MLOGIT-adjusted shares of each type by treatment
KH Implicit Explicit
% Share 95% CI % Share 95% CI % Share 95% CI
Cooperators 13.6 12.8–14.4 10.8 10.4–11.2 4.4 4.1–4.7
Free-riders 21.0 20.0–22.0 26.5 25.9–27.1 11.8 11.3–12.2
Reciprocators 65.4 64.3–66.6 62.7 62.0–63.4 83.8 83.3–84.4